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Promising to be the best companion for scientific naturalism, compatibilism usually 
espouses a reductivist event-causal background. lynne Baker challenges this view, 
arguing that compatibilist moral responsibility also requires an irreducible “first-person 
perspective”. in this paper i will provide some arguments for claiming that (frankfurt-
type) event-causal accounts cannot avoid making reference to some sort of agential 
properties. in the second part, i will present the proposals formulated by nelkin and 
Markosian for defending agent-causation, before returning to the theme with which i 
began, this time considering frankfurt’s view in the light of Baker’s reading.
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compatibilism, as i understand it, is a label that characterizes several 
different views, which share the idea that the truth of determinism is 
compatible with the existence of free will and/or with the plausibility of 
moral responsibility attributions. Promising to be the best companion for 
scientific naturalism, compatibilism – with some notable exceptions (Nelkin 
2011; markosian 1999, 2012; horgan 2007) – usually espouses an event- (or 
state-) causal background, in which intentional action is explained in 
terms of the interaction between different mental states that causally 
determine one’s choices. in her latest book (2013), lynne baker claims that 
moral responsibility (like agency) requires something more than this and, 
in particular, it requires an irreducible first-person perspective, something 
that is usually not so welcome in scientific naturalistic views. Since Baker 
does not want to give up either (“near”) naturalism, or some event-causal 
background, or compatibilism, her proposal sounds especially challenging.
The paper is organized as follows. First, in order to carve out a more specific 
battlefield, I will focus on determinism-friendly accounts originating 
from harry Frankfurt’s seminal work. my working hypothesis is that 
Frankfurt-type compatibilism faces some difficulties in explaining how 
we are in control of our actions and, in particular, what happens when one 
experiences a clash among different motivational streams. i will try to show 
that these accounts cannot avoid making reference to some sort of agential 
properties, and i will mention the proposals formulated by dana nelkin and 
ned markosian to defend compatibilist agent-causation. then – given the 
dubious implications of these approaches and with some new concepts in 
place – i will return to the theme with which i began, this time considering 
Frankfurt’s position in the light of baker’s reading.
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according to Frankfurt (1988), one acts freely and responsibly, when one 
acts on a first-order desire that is in accord with a correspondent second-
order desire/volition. there is a sense in which, acting as he wants, the 
willing addict (who wants to will to take the drug) is free and responsible for 
taking the drug, while the unwilling addict (who desires to take the drug but 
does not want to will to take the drug) is not. moral responsibility is understood 
in terms of “identification”: “Even if the person is not responsible for the fact that 
the desire occurs, there is an important sense in which he takes responsibility for 
the fact of having the desire – the fact that the desire is in the fullest sense his, that 
it constitutes what he really wants – when he identifies himself with it” (Frankfurt 
1988, p. 170).
Frankfurt-type compatibilism has been reformulated in several ways, in which 
different sorts of mental states play the leading role (e.g. Watson 2004, pp. 13-32; 
bratman 2001). there are various reasons why these accounts, despite the powerful 
objections moved by their critics, have a widespread consensus. much of their 
appeal resides in the fact that they seem to fit both the standard story in theory of 
action and the reductivist view in philosophy of mind, explaining how our actions 
are up to us (how we can control our conduct) without referring to irreducible 
agential properties. mental events play the leading role and, in principle, nothing 
prevents their reduction to physical states.
however, it is not clear whether these accounts are able to explain control in a 
proper way. indeed, it is often held that, both in their libertarian and in their 
compatibilist interpretations, they are victims of the syndrome of the disappearing 
agent, a version of the more general luck objection (hume 1739; Pereboom 2004, 2012, 
2014, 2015; mele 2006): in the absence of a further explanation of how the choice is 
up to us, the decision occurs as a result of the causal factors already in place, and 
there is no way to support ordinary moral responsibility attributions. the fact that 
the agent might turn out to be a “passive bystander” of a string of mental events 
represented a serious issue for Frankfurt himself (1988, p. 54). What is doubtful is 
if identification, or something similar, is sufficient for filling the gap1. the problem 
is that control is hard to reduce to identification with specific mental states: by 
contrast, it seems that one can control one’s choice if one is able to make a decision 
(at least partially) independently of the motivational force of one’s mental states. 
the situations characterized by the presence of contrasting motives help to stress
1   bratman expresses a similar concern: “in some cases we suppose, further, that the agent is 
the source of, determines, directs, governs, the action and is not merely the locus of a series of 
happenings, of causal pushes and pulls” (2001, p. 311). velleman explores the idea of the agent as 
a master of desire in a state or event-causal framework, looking for a kind of mental state that 
can play a role functionally identical to the role of the agent: “We must therefore look for mental 
events and states that are functionally identical to the agent, in the sense that they play the causal 
role that ordinary parlance attributes to him” (velleman 1992, p. 475).
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 this point (cfr. Frankfurt 1988, pp. 47-57). the following is a case characterized 
by opposed first-order desires: Roger wants to climb the Mount rushmore national 
Memorial but – since there is a fine that discourages people from climbing – Roger 
opts for avoiding the risk. now compare roger with the unwilling addict. the 
difference rests on the fact that roger can control his decision, while the unwilling 
addict does not have this power. the lack of sameness among the desires is not 
indicative by itself, but only to the extent that it might reveal the practical inability 
to exercise control over one’s desiderative states. only in such cases the absence 
of identification undermines moral responsibility. Even in situations of deep 
ambivalence – in which one is divided between opposing second-order desires/
volitions – it is not the lack of identification by itself that does help to illuminate 
moral responsibility attributions. consider a less mundane example, a Frankfurt-
type version of the story of the lady of the camellias. deciding to leave alfredo under 
the pressure of his father, violetta is divided between two opposed second-order 
desires: she both wants to be moved by the desire to spend her life with alfredo, and 
by the desire to help him to have a better life. being in a condition of ambivalence 
does not undermine her responsibility. From a phenomenological point of view, 
violetta appears to be fully responsible because the decision belongs to her – a 
reasonable adult woman – independently of her identification with a specific 
mental state. moral responsibility attributions depend on the internal structure 
of her choice in virtue of the fact that she appears to be an agent, who can master 
different desires, reasons and plans, and whose practical identity goes beyond the 
sum of her mental states.
However, the idea of an “agent causing an action” does not fit a reductivist event-
causal framework, and speaking up for agential properties seems slippery for a 
variety of reasons. conceiving the agent as a peculiar substance capable of causally 
interacting with the physical dimension might not fit the naturalistic vision of the 
world also in a broadly construed naturalism (de caro & voltolini 2010, p. 76).
one strategy is to replace the event-causal framework with an agent-causal 
background. The defining claim of agent-causation is that agents are substances 
capable of causing decisions or intention-formations (Pereboom 2015). the adoption 
of the agent-causal perspective has traditionally characterized a branch of libertarian 
views on free will and moral responsibility (o’connor 2000) but, more recently, it has 
been also advocated by some compatibilists. For example, nelkin (2011) and markosian 
(1999, 2012) both proposed compatibilist approaches to agent-causation, which deny 
that it is incompatible with determinism.
markosian develops a hybrid account, where agent-causation coexists with event-
causation inside a materialistic conception. an action is morally free iff it is caused 
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admitting double causation – according to which the very same event can be produced 
by two independent factors – an action freely produced by an agent can also be 
produced in an event-causal way. it might be objected that, if it is only the event-
causal stream that is deterministic (while the agent-causal one is indeterministic), the 
account fails to provide a compatibilist version of agent-causation (Pereboom 2015). 
otherwise, if both are deterministic and are causing the very same event, either (a) 
the physical occurrences characterizing the event-causal stream are not sufficient by 
themselves and the interaction with the agential causal powers should be explained 
or (b) the physical occurrences characterizing the event-causal stream are sufficient 
and the agential causal powers appear to be redundant (and, if the physical realm is 
complete, there seems to be no reason for admitting extra causal powers [bennett 
2003]). one of the burdens of such a view is that the analysis of the structure of the 
choice-making process – the core of Frankfurt-type compatibilism – partially loses 
its centrality. no matter the circumstances of choice, the action is free because an 
agent produces it (markosian 2012, p. 384). then markosian – with the questionable 
assumption that, if the action is morally wrong, then it has to be morally free – has to 
admit that also a brainwashed individual (like Patriot Kid, who shoots the president 
after being kidnapped and manipulated by martians [markosian 1999, p. 272]) is 
morally responsible.
Nelkin instead provides a unified account, in which the only form of causation 
that exists is substance causation (lowe 2008), whose effects are determined: given 
the kind of substance the agents are, and the circumstances in which the action 
occurs, the choice is deterministically produced. nelkin adopts a distinction made 
by o’connor (2000; cfr. dretske 1993) between structuring and triggering causes. While 
reasons are the structuring causes of a choice (structuring one’s propensities), the 
agent, with his specific causal power, is the triggering cause that settles the final 
decision. In our story, Violetta, with her specific causal power, makes a choice, which 
turns out to be determined. a source of doubt is that – once one’s propensities have 
been already structured – it is not clear how the power to settle the (determined) 
final decision is to be understood in a way that might preserve one’s ability to 
control one’s own conduct. despite some obscurities, deterministic agent-causation 
might represent a promising path. however, for many – at least without further 
clarifications – the assumption that the agents cause events remains controversial or 
even unintelligible, and turns out to be a sort of ignotum per ignotius explanation.
a different perspective is sketched by lynne baker. in her work, baker addresses 
directly the problem of moral responsibility recruiting Frankfurt’s event-causal 
framework, which might be revised in the light of an explicit reference to the ro-
bust form of the first-person perspective on agency, defined as “the capacity to think of 
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and intended as incompatible with a third-person ontology2. Why is this “defining 
characteristic of persons” (2013, p. 201) – who “can consider the reasons” they “have 
and choose to act on them” (2013, p. 202) – supposed to improve Frankfurt-type ap-
proaches? 
the most peculiar aspect of Frankfurt’s hierarchical view consisted in the 
idea that, in order to be morally responsible, one should be able to conceive 
the mental states leading to action as one’s own. in baker’s Reflective-
endorsement, it is this essential capacity that gives people the limited 
amount of control – the ability to consider the reasons we have and to act 
on them – that might save the day for compatibilism3. more precisely, an 
“agent is morally responsible for an action if he endorses the beliefs and the 
desires on which he acts: When he affirms them as his own […], he is morally 
responsible for acting on them” (2013, p. 205). according to baker, the appeal 
to the first-person perspective is not to be intended merely as a reference to 
the practical unity of the subject, but implies an ontological commitment. 
as mentioned earlier, one intriguing aspect of baker’s proposal is that it is 
committed to preserve an event-causal framework. but how is the concept of 
an “event” to be understood? Following Kim, baker interprets an event as an 
object’s having a property at a time (2007, p. 97). What should be abandoned 
is rather the reductivist spirit according to which conscious mental events 
are reducible to physical states. in virtue of being (emergent) upper level 
properties-instances, mental states are irreducible to lower-level physical 
properties-instances, turning out to be independently causally efficacious4.
the relation between the two orders is conceived in terms of constitution: 
given certain favorable circumstances, the higher-level properties-instances 
are constituted by, but not reducible to, the lower level ones, as a cat 
2   “Frankfurt, Velleman, and Bratman […] all speak of an agent’s reflective participation in 
her action as if reflective participation […] is compatible with a third-person ontology. Many 
philosophers do not acknowledge that the first-person perspective presents a problem for 
scientific naturalism” (Baker 2013, p. XVII).
3   the Reflective Endorsement view is articulated as follows.
(re) a person s is morally responsible for a choice or action X if X occurs and:(1) s wills X,(2) s wants that she* will X [i.e., s wants to will X],(3) s wills X because she* wants to will X, and(4) s would still have wanted to will X even if she had known the provenance of her* wanting to 
will X.
Where the fourth condition specifies that the agent would not repudiate her desires given that 
she is aware of their provenance, and the “*” identifies the first-person perspective (Baker 2013, 
p. 204).
4 baker vindicates commonsense causation (as making something happen, giving rise to 
something): “an object x (or a property instance) has causal powers if and only if x has a property 
F in virtue of which x has effects” (2007, p. 98. see also baker 2011, pp. 12-13). about baker’s 
emergentism, see instead baker 2013, p. 220; 2007, p. 237.
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is constituted by, but not reducible to, the sum of its particles5: “the 
constitution view, applied to property-instances, allows intentional 
phenomena to have causal efficacy” (Baker 2011, p. 13). For making sense of 
the moral realm, some first-person properties should be admitted in 
our ontology: “Property P is a first-person property if either (1) P entails 
that whatever exemplifies it has the capacity to interact consciously and 
intentionally with the environment and/or (2) P entails that whatever 
exemplifies it can conceive of herself as herself* in the first-person” (Baker 
2013, p. 172).
Without considering the traditional objections towards the anti-reductivist 
program in general, a doubt i wish to explore in the remaining part of 
the paper regards constitution and its dependence on some favourable 
circumstances. Irreducible (and causally efficacious) emergent properties 
are produced by their subatomic constituents, given the presence of the 
relevant circumstances6. differently from supervenience (which is necessary 
and independent of contextual factors), constitution occurs only if the 
microphysical constituents are accompanied by the relevant circumstances, 
so that “although a constituting property-instance does not supervene 
on its constituting property-instances, it may supervene ultimately on its 
subatomic constituters together with the microphysical supervenience base 
of all the circumstances in which the instance of the constitution relation 
obtains” (baker 2013, pp. 219-220). since baker’s near naturalism leaves the 
door open for the truth of the causal-closure thesis (ibidem), the emergent 
properties are constituted by their microphysical particles plus the relevant 
circumstances that, in turn, are also constituted by their microphysical 
particles. then (even though that particular lower-level event does not 
necessitate that particular higher-level event), one might object that the 
upper-level properties and, in particular, the first-person perspective – the 
locus where the non-biological (baker 2000, p. 17) discontinuity between 
human and non-human animals takes place – turn out to be a practical 
(epiphenomenal?) stance with no really independent causal powers, a lens 
through which one regards oneself as a unity, but without having a grasp of 
the ontological reality.
my last concern regards the kind of moral responsibility that is in question. 
the direction taken by baker to escape the disappearing agent objection is 
quite promising: the implicit reference to the first-person point of view – 
5  about mental causation and constitution, see baker 1993, 2007, 2013. For a different account of 
constitution (“the made up of relation”), inside a non-reductivist framework, see Pereboom 2011, 
pp. 135-141.
6   “Whether or not constitution obtains depends in large measure on the circumstances” (baker 
2013, p. 209).
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which is hidden in Frankfurt’s approach – is thus made explicit and it is now 
possible to account for cases of opposing desires and ambivalence, in which 
one is in control of one’s choice because one refers the opposing mental 
states to oneself. nevertheless, even incompatibilists usually do not deny 
that, also given the truth of determinism, one can endorse one’s beliefs and 
desires, or think about the origins of one’s mental states, thus forming a 
sort of first-person perspective, and having the impression of being able to 
shape the causes of one’s choices. however, nothing proves that this picture, 
which fits a certain phenomenology of agency, is not a post-factum illusory 
reconstruction (despite Baker’s denial: “The first-person perspective cannot 
be acquired by neural manipulation” [2013, p. 202; see also baker 2006]), 
or a “center of narrative gravity”, to use daniel dennett’s words (1992). to 
dismiss these worries, baker claims that her core concerns diverge, for 
example, from those that inspire the theories of confabulation in cognitive 
sciences (carruthers 2013. see also e.g. Wegner 2002; Preston & Wegner 2005; 
marraffa & Paternoster 2013), which are mainly focused on the idea that, 
given for example the opacity of introspection (carruthers 2011), we might 
be mistaken “about the sources of our first-order beliefs” (Baker 2013, p. 64) 
or about the content of our inner life. baker’s theory rather concerns the 
question: “under what conditions can we have beliefs about our beliefs at 
all?” (2013, p. 64): having a robust first-person perspective, or “conceiving 
of oneself as having a perspective” (2013, p. 82) is meant to be the basic 
requisite for having a inner life, something that cannot be understood in 
terms of a misleading rationalization and self-ascription of mental states. 
yet, does my awareness of my inner life – no matter the possible lack of 
insight into my first-order mental states – represent a strong basis for moral 
responsibility attributions? the problem with compatibilism does not seem 
to be that one might be unable to conceive of oneself as oneself. the limit is 
rather that – once accepted that our choices are determined by factors that 
are beyond us – we could hardly make sense of the concept of accountability7 
that, for many, is what moral responsibility is supposed to be.
nevertheless, even though it is unlikely that baker’s account proves 
successful against traditional incompatibilist worries, it opens a thought-
provoking line for those who share compatibilist intuitions and, more 
generally, for those – including myself – who are inclined to think that 
moral responsibility has (much) to do with identification with motives 
mediated through practical reasoning.
7   at least for certain interpretations, the idea that one deserves to be blamed and praised in 
virtue of the choice one made (cfr. Watson 2004, pp. 260-288; Pereboom 2001, p. XX).
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